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<img width="150" height="150" src="https://davelevy.info/wiki/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/eudilema-deepai.org-cc0-150x150.jpg" class="attachment-thumbnail size-thumbnail wp-post-image" alt="an ai generated image of a map of europe with the EU & German flag." decoding="async" srcset="https://davelevy.info/wiki/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/eudilema-deepai.org-cc0-150x150.jpg 150w, https://davelevy.info/wiki/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/eudilema-deepai.org-cc0-100x100.jpg 100w" sizes="(max-width: 150px) 100vw, 150px" />I was sent an English [machine] translation of a speech by Jürgen Habermas together with a prequel summary. … I am sharing below the new speech by 96-year-old Jürgen Habermas, titled “From Here On, We Must Go Alone,” which he gave at the Siemens Foundation in Munich. It is about the future of Europe and...
<img width="150" height="150" src="https://davelevy.info/wiki/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/eudilema-deepai.org-cc0-150x150.jpg" class="attachment-thumbnail size-thumbnail wp-post-image" alt="an ai generated image of a map of europe with the EU & German flag." decoding="async" srcset="https://davelevy.info/wiki/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/eudilema-deepai.org-cc0-150x150.jpg 150w, https://davelevy.info/wiki/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/eudilema-deepai.org-cc0-100x100.jpg 100w" sizes="(max-width: 150px) 100vw, 150px" /> I was sent an English [machine] translation of a speech by Jürgen Habermas together with a prequel summary. … I am sharing below the new speech by 96-year-old Jürgen Habermas, titled “From Here On, We Must Go Alone,” which he gave at the Siemens Foundation in Munich. It is about the future of Europe and its relations with the US. Basically, he traces what he calls the “democratically legitimized winding up of the oldest democracy on earth.” By this he means the United States. He sets out how the Trumpists are attacking the separation of powers on which the rule of law rests. They are carrying out a “rapid, arbitrarily autocratic expansion of an executive power that has at the same time been cut down to size and purged.” This, he writes, is taking place against the backdrop of “a legal system that is running into the void, gradually hollowed out from the top down.” Trump has “usurped the legislative powers of Congress” and has already made the army in its higher ranks “pliant.” He knows that Washington in 2025 is not Berlin in 1933. But it is clear that he fears for “the rule-of-law system of the United States.” “To this day,” he says, “I see no convincing signs of a reversal of the course that has been set towards a politically authoritarian-steered, technocratically administered but economically libertarian social system.” Habermas postulates that the EU must now constitute itself as an “autonomous player,” independently of the United States and independently of “system-distorting compromises with the USA or other authoritarian states.” So he counts the United States among the authoritarian states. Yet he then shows, using the example of Ukraine, how difficult—indeed nearly impossible—this independence for the time being is. For the complete speech (machine translated): From here on we have to go on alone In view of the new power relations in this world, the further political integration of Europe is more vital for survival than ever before. A bitter reckoning. And a hope. By Jürgen Habermas. Süddeutsche Zeitung, 21 November 2025 The Russian invasion of Ukraine has triggered, among the European populations, a delayed awareness of a profoundly changed global situation. This change, however, had long been in the making with the decline of the United States, the superpower of the 20th century. An alarm signal for this was already the abruptly altered mood in the civil society of the United States after 11 September 2001. This shift in the mentality of a frightened population was further whipped up by the rhetoric of the then government under President George W. Bush and his ruthlessly militant vice president. Everyone seemed almost physically to sense the dangers of international terrorism. In the course of the propaganda for the war against Saddam Hussein and Iraq, which violated international law, this change in mentality became radicalized and solidified. Institutionally speaking, it was above all the party system that was affected by this change. Already during the 1990s, under the leadership of Newt Gingrich, not only had the practice of the Republican Party fundamentally changed, but so too had the social composition of its supporters. The tendencies of a deeper and by now, it seems, hardly reversible transformation of the political system as a whole only fully established themselves, however, after President Obama had disappointed the hopes for a thoroughly changed foreign policy of the United States. In the meantime, the weakening of the international position of the former superpower is unmistakable. This was once again signaled at the recent APEC summit in South Korea at the end of October: the unsettled alliance partners of the United States are now seeking agreements with other neighbors who are more neutral or more dependent on China. And after the early departure of the American president, who is more interested in quick deals than in the long-term stability of US influence, China’s President Xi is said to have set the tone with his promotion of a conception of a multicultural world society under China’s leadership. Ever since the People’s Republic was admitted to the World Trade Organization, shrewd governments have pursued the goal of turning their country into a leading economic great power. But only since Xi Jinping took office in 2012 has it become a declared goal, presented with a certain “defensive aggressiveness”, to replace the liberal world trade regime with a Sino-centric world political order. With the Belt and Road Initiative, China had for some time been pursuing more far-reaching strategic and security policy goals. The greatest beneficiaries have been Russia, Pakistan, Malaysia and Indonesia. But for developing and emerging countries too, China is now likely the largest source of funds. This primarily economic shift in power reveals itself generally in the fact that, from a geopolitical perspective, the decisive conflicts will in future be concentrated in Southeast Asia. It will be interesting to observe how Trump’s assumption of power will affect Taiwan’s domestic politics. But apart from this flashpoint, it is not only China and its regional allies on the one hand and, on the other, the United States and the countries of the region that tend toward the West—above all Japan, South Korea and Australia—that confront each other here. In the immediate vicinity, India is now also pursuing its own great-power ambitions. The shift in geopolitical power relations is reflected not only in the Pacific area, but also in the rise of middle powers such as Brazil, South Africa or India, which are confidently striving for greater independence. Many such rising states are now seeking admission to the loose and meanwhile enlarged association of the BRICS states. The deep geoeconomic changes in the liberal world economic order, which had been created by the United States since the end of the Second World War, also point to an end of Western hegemony. It is not that this rules-based world trade order—now strained even by Trump himself—could simply be liquidated, as one can see today in the interesting dispute over the delivery of rare earths. But hardly anything could better illustrate the now customary security policy restrictions on world trade than the recent decision of the government of Germany, the world export champion, to support the internationally no longer competitive German steel industry with state funds. Although these changes in the geopolitical power relations have been emerging for some time, and although, at the beginning of the war in Ukraine, a renewed election of Trump could by no means be ruled out, the Western governments did not grasp, after Russia’s invasion, that this conflict, once its outbreak had not been prevented, absolutely had to be brought to an end within Joe Biden’s term of office. In the meantime, with Trump’s second term in office, what had long been announced in the programmatic text of the Heritage Foundation has come to pass: the hardly reversible dismantling of the oldest liberal-democratic regime, according to a pattern we have already come to know in Europe from the example of Hungary and other states. These new types of authoritarian regimes cannot evidently be traced back to the particular circumstances of a botched dismantling of post-Soviet forms of rule. Rather, they are the forerunners of the democratically legitimized dismantling of the oldest democracy on earth and of the rapid establishment and expansion of a technocratically administered, libertarian-capitalist form of rule. What we are witnessing in the United States is the same transition from one “system” to another—by no means especially creeping, but rather, in view of a more or less paralyzed opposition, relatively inconspicuous: the last or penultimate democratic election was the long-announced starting signal for a rapid, arbitrary-autocratic expansion of an executive branch that has at the same time been trimmed down and purged. Trump abuses this power without regard for objections from a legal system that is gradually being hollowed out from top to bottom and is increasingly running into the void. The president has first, through his rigid tariff policy, usurped the legislative powers of parliament and tried to restrict step by step the independence of the press and the university system. Then he intimidated the opposition by deploying the National Guard, unbidden, in major cities such as Los Angeles, Washington and Chicago. Their mere presence signals the government’s willingness, should the occasion arise, to use an army that has already been rendered compliant in its upper ranks against its own citizens. While within the EU the party system and democratic elections are still protected even in authoritarian states such as Hungary (or formerly Poland), their fate in the United States is for the time being open. Following the most recent, localized election successes of the Democrats, Trump’s aim is the marginalization and disparagement of the political opposition using methods of denunciation. In foreign policy, he does not concern himself with international law either, as his arbitrary military actions against smugglers off the coast of Venezuela show. The most astonishing and so far not plausibly explained phenomenon of this creeping yet single-mindedly pursued takeover of power is, above all, the timidity of a largely resistant-less civil society—not to mention the willingness of students and professors to adapt, who only recently had pushed to the limit, on their campuses, their cost-free resistance against the allegedly colonial power Israel. This is not to suggest that we would behave differently. I see, up to now, no convincing signs of a reversal of the course set towards a politically authoritarian-steered, technocratically administered but economically libertarian social system. For Trump’s possible successors possess an even more closed “worldview” than does the pathologically narcissistic president, fixated on short-term personal “gains” and on confirmation and recognition, who would prefer to be seen as a tycoon and Nobel Peace Prize laureate rather than as a politician with vision. For the foregoing reflections I cannot claim any competence beyond that of a newspaper reader. They interest me above all with regard to the question of what the shift in geopolitical weight and the long-prepared political division of the West mean, in the present situation, for Europe. In what follows, I proceed on the assumption that, with a few isolated exceptions, the governments of the EU and its member states still have the firm will, for the time being, to adhere to the normative foundations and the well-established practices of their constitutions. From this follows the political goal of strengthening their weight to such an extent that the EU can assert itself, in world politics and world society, independently of the United States and independently of system-distorting compromises with the USA or other authoritarian states, as an autonomous player. Already for this reason there is, on our side, an interest in a rapid ceasefire sought by the Ukrainian leadership. This has a consequence for Europe that is now no longer possible to overlook. The EU cannot politically distance itself from the passive United States, which has stepped back, as it were, into the ranks as a NATO member, even though this has the result that “the West” still acts, but can no longer speak with one voice in normative terms. The war in Ukraine forces the EU to hold fast to an alliance with the United States within the framework of NATO, an alliance which, due to the recent change of regime in its most important and hitherto reliably leading member, can no longer credibly invoke human rights to justify its military support for Ukraine. With regard to the continuation of the war in Ukraine, “we”, if I may continue to speak from this European perspective, remain dependent on the support of the United States already for the reason that we do not possess its technologies for the necessary aerial reconnaissance. Without the support of the USA, the Ukrainian front could not be held. But these United States, which can no longer uphold, in normative terms, the role they had declared under Biden as a support for Ukraine legitimate under international law, and which at best supply weapons that Europe (that is, in effect, the Federal Republic of Germany) pays for, have become an unpredictable partner for their allies. Already for this reason, there is also on our side an interest in the rapid ceasefire sought by the Ukrainian leadership. This has a disadvantageous consequence for Europe that has, up to now, not been thematized. The EU cannot politically distance itself from the passive NATO member USA, which has, as it were, stepped back into the ranks, even though this has the consequence that “the West” still acts together, but can no longer speak with one voice in normative terms. The war in Ukraine forces the EU to hold fast to an alliance with the United States within a NATO which, due to the admonished change of regime in its most important and hitherto leading member, can no longer credibly invoke human rights to justify its military support for Ukraine. Anyone who has heard Trump’s recent speech before the UN General Assembly must admit that the rhetoric of international-law justification for taking the side of the attacked Ukraine, claimed since the first day of the conflict by what was at that time still a united West, has been devalued. Not affected by this embarrassment is only that group of originally thirty states which extends beyond the EU but, under the leadership of France and the United Kingdom and independently of the USA, has come together to support Ukraine. It is therefore, as I hope, an unintended irony that this group of states has thoughtlessly given itself the name “coalition of the willing”—that same name under which George W. Bush, with the help of the British prime minister but against the resistance of France and Germany, assembled a coalition in support of his invasion of Iraq in violation of international law. After this sketch of the altered situation of a divided West, I now come to my main question: how realistic is it to strive for further political unification of the EU with the aim of being recognized, within the framework of world society, not only as one of the economically most significant trading partners, but as an independent subject capable of political self-assertion and action? Although the newer member states in the East of the EU are the loudest in calling for rearmament, they are the least prepared to restrict their own national sovereign powers for the sake of such a common strengthening. In view of this consequence, the initiative would have to come—although Meloni’s national government would fail in this respect as well—from the western core countries of the Union and today, in view of France’s current weakness, primarily from Germany. The recently begun development of a common European defense force could provide the impetus for this. Eurobonds are also anathema to Merz, in this quite the son of Schäuble The Bundestag has now approved funds for substantial expansion and build-up of the Bundeswehr, though the questionable justification with the allegedly current danger of a Russian attack on NATO need not concern me here. The federal government is pursuing the development of “the strongest army in Europe” under the premises of the existing treaties, that is, ultimately within the framework of its national sovereign powers. In doing so, it is continuing the hypocritical European policy it practiced under Chancellor Merkel: rhetorically always pro-European, it rejected in past decades various French initiatives for closer economic integration, most recently the urgent initiative of the newly elected French President Macron. But Eurobonds are also, for Chancellor Merz—here very much the son of Schäuble—anathema. There is no serious sign that the federal government is taking serious steps to bring about a European Union capable of acting on the global political stage. Admittedly, in an era of daily growing right-wing populism in all our countries, such a step—long overdue—towards further integration of the EU and thus towards its global capacity to act would find even less spontaneous support than before. In most Western member states of the EU, too, domestic political forces favoring a decentering or rolling back of the EU, or at least a weakening of Brussels’ competences, are stronger than ever. I therefore consider it likely that Europe will be less able than ever to detach itself from the former leading power, the USA. Whether it will be able, in this slipstream, to preserve its normative, and up to now still democratic and liberal, self-understanding will then be a central challenge. At the end of a political life that has been, politically speaking, rather favored, it is not easy for me, despite everything, to draw the following exhortative conclusion: the further political integration of at least the core of the European Union has never been so vital for our survival as it is today—and never so unlikely. This text is the slightly revised manuscript by Jürgen Habermas for the Süddeutsche Zeitung of the lecture that the philosopher delivered on 19 November at a colloquium on the crisis of Western democracies at the Siemens Foundation in Munich. Italics are by DFL The featured image is made by deepai.org, from the following prompt, “the european union needs democracy, unity and defence but Germany and Eastern Europe are conflicted”
<img width="150" height="150" src="https://davelevy.info/wiki/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/windows-berlin-cc-dfl-2024-BY-150x150.jpg" class="attachment-thumbnail size-thumbnail wp-post-image" alt="inside the German Bundestag dome" decoding="async" srcset="https://davelevy.info/wiki/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/windows-berlin-cc-dfl-2024-BY-150x150.jpg 150w, https://davelevy.info/wiki/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/windows-berlin-cc-dfl-2024-BY-100x100.jpg 100w" sizes="(max-width: 150px) 100vw, 150px" />There’s a lot of stuff claiming that W11 is bloated and the bloat impacts performance. I decided to experiment and here are my notes. On the systems I have chosen to slim down, I use https://github.com/Raphire/Win11Debloat/wiki to uninstall those programs, applications and services I no longer require. (I have used another, but it was less...
<img width="150" height="150" src="https://davelevy.info/wiki/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/windows-berlin-cc-dfl-2024-BY-150x150.jpg" class="attachment-thumbnail size-thumbnail wp-post-image" alt="inside the German Bundestag dome" decoding="async" loading="lazy" srcset="https://davelevy.info/wiki/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/windows-berlin-cc-dfl-2024-BY-150x150.jpg 150w, https://davelevy.info/wiki/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/windows-berlin-cc-dfl-2024-BY-100x100.jpg 100w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 150px) 100vw, 150px" /> There’s a lot of stuff claiming that W11 is bloated and the bloat impacts performance. I decided to experiment and here are my notes. On the systems I have chosen to slim down, I use https://github.com/Raphire/Win11Debloat/wiki to uninstall those programs, applications and services I no longer require. (I have used another, but it was less transparent and quite rough with the registry. Gemini describes the process and points at alternatives. This leaves the so-called Telemetry, which involves un-setting some switches and stopping/disabling a service i.e. Connected User Experience and Telemetry. For Google Gemini https://gemini.google.com/share/bc85ad270803 on the Settings switches. For the service, use services.msc. Unfortunately, these may be “rectified” by some windows updates. Service Management I looked at programming this, with help from Chatgpt, here are some code offerings, developed in the opposite order. Connected User Experience and Telemetry with TCL https://chatgpt.com/share/69a16aad-86f4-800d-91a7-0bc11068b156 Connected User Experience and Telemetry with GUI in Powershell https://chatgpt.com/share/69a16b1b-7824-800d-b25e-1c7c7e54d813; what? My first attempt without a GUI in Powershell https://chatgpt.com/share/69a16b32-5408-800d-b4c8-9c1c7568ef7d I need to workout which of HP’s programs I can de-install. See also https://davelevy.info/wiki/tag/w11/ & https://davelevy.info/wiki/my-newest-w10-build/
<img width="150" height="150" src="https://davelevy.info/wiki/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/Orator_at_Speakers_Corner_CC-BAAW-BY-SA-3.0-1974-wikipedia-150x150.jpg" class="attachment-thumbnail size-thumbnail wp-post-image" alt="Orator at Speakers Corner, 1974" decoding="async" loading="lazy" srcset="https://davelevy.info/wiki/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/Orator_at_Speakers_Corner_CC-BAAW-BY-SA-3.0-1974-wikipedia-150x150.jpg 150w, https://davelevy.info/wiki/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/Orator_at_Speakers_Corner_CC-BAAW-BY-SA-3.0-1974-wikipedia-100x100.jpg 100w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 150px) 100vw, 150px" />A lengthy post on “Free Speech/Free Expresion” by Graham Smith on linkein caused me to pick up my copy of “Prohibiting incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence”, published by article 19 in December 2012 which reviews the conflicts between the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on civil and political rights. The...
<img width="150" height="150" src="https://davelevy.info/wiki/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/Orator_at_Speakers_Corner_CC-BAAW-BY-SA-3.0-1974-wikipedia-150x150.jpg" class="attachment-thumbnail size-thumbnail wp-post-image" alt="Orator at Speakers Corner, 1974" decoding="async" loading="lazy" srcset="https://davelevy.info/wiki/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/Orator_at_Speakers_Corner_CC-BAAW-BY-SA-3.0-1974-wikipedia-150x150.jpg 150w, https://davelevy.info/wiki/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/Orator_at_Speakers_Corner_CC-BAAW-BY-SA-3.0-1974-wikipedia-100x100.jpg 100w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 150px) 100vw, 150px" /> A lengthy post on “Free Speech/Free Expresion” by Graham Smith on linkein caused me to pick up my copy of “Prohibiting incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence”, published by article 19 in December 2012 which reviews the conflicts between the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on civil and political rights. The former of which creates a comprehensive right to seek and receive information while the latter in its article 20(2) Requires signatory states to prohibit certain forms of speech which are intended to sow hatred. Much formal and informal transatlantic conversations on the subject of free speech would seem to downplay the latter and with the rise of revenge porn and non-consensual privacy violations on the internet, it is necessary to consider other universal rights, such as the right to dignity (A1) and privacy (A12). NB The United States is a signatory to the ICCPR; twitter/x and Facebook are not human beings and so may not claim human rights law protection and neither do bots nor AIs. The Article 19 pamphlet explores the treaties’ provisions in some depth and sensitivity proposing that national laws should explicitly prohibit incitement; this would still leave breaches of Article 1 & 12 rights with limited recourse to remedy granted in Article 8. Graham’s Linkedin Post The Universal Declaration of Human Rights Prohibiting incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence by Article 19 Image Credit: BeenAroundAWhile at English Wikipedia, CC BY-SA 3.0 https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0, via Wikimedia Commons
<img width="150" height="150" src="https://davelevy.info/wiki/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/overtake-pavels-unsplash-w1080-150x150.png" class="attachment-thumbnail size-thumbnail wp-post-image" alt="overtaking prohibited ends sign" decoding="async" loading="lazy" srcset="https://davelevy.info/wiki/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/overtake-pavels-unsplash-w1080-150x150.png 150w, https://davelevy.info/wiki/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/overtake-pavels-unsplash-w1080-100x100.png 100w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 150px) 100vw, 150px" />One of the reform proposals at the end of the last EU mandate, was a multi-speed Europe. I reported on the most explicit initiative https://davelevy.info/wiki/sailing-the-high-seas-reforming-and-enlarging-the-eu/ . Has the time come again to look at this as an answer to the EU’s sclerosis. The challenges are clear, with the federalists or federalist adjacent players looking at...
<img width="150" height="150" src="https://davelevy.info/wiki/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/overtake-pavels-unsplash-w1080-150x150.png" class="attachment-thumbnail size-thumbnail wp-post-image" alt="overtaking prohibited ends sign" decoding="async" loading="lazy" srcset="https://davelevy.info/wiki/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/overtake-pavels-unsplash-w1080-150x150.png 150w, https://davelevy.info/wiki/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/overtake-pavels-unsplash-w1080-100x100.png 100w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 150px) 100vw, 150px" /> One of the reform proposals at the end of the last EU mandate, was a multi-speed Europe. I reported on the most explicit initiative https://davelevy.info/wiki/sailing-the-high-seas-reforming-and-enlarging-the-eu/ . Has the time come again to look at this as an answer to the EU’s sclerosis. The challenges are clear, with the federalists or federalist adjacent players looking at capital market integration, a savings and investment union, defence spending, and supply chain security being issues of concern, while the nationalists are concerned about increasing competencies, and are developing ideas for decentralisation. What will happen? The Telegraph, with for it, a remarkably unemotional article on the case for and prospects of greater integration. The map of prospects without the UK makes me sad though. The moves are further reported by Euronews, https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2026/02/11/as-challenges-mount-a-two-speed-europe-emerges-as-a-way-out And Politico https://www.politico.eu/newsletter/brussels-playbook/presenting-europes-two-speed-era/ I did a Gemini query, “is there a proposal within the European Union for a two-speed Europe?” and produce the argument at the end of this article. My page https://davelevy.info/wiki/eu-reform/ documents the EP’s response to COFOE and probably represents the zenith of the federalist push within the last mandate. While we talk of a single mandate and while the Parliament and Commission are pretty stable, the Council varies in membership with the election cycles of the member states. In many ways, https://davelevy.info/wiki/sailing-the-high-seas-reforming-and-enlarging-the-eu/ could be seen as the Council’s response to the Parliament’s resolution documented by me at https://davelevy.info/wiki/eu-reform/. They ran out of time, and the Council didn’t want a treaty convention. I comment and collect links about the legal structures of the EU at Subsidiarity and proportionality Gemini says, Yes, as of early 2026, the concept of a “two-speed Europe” has transitioned from a theoretical debate to a concrete political strategy driven by the European Union’s most powerful economies and its top leadership. The primary motivation is a growing frustration with unanimity rules, which many leaders believe have caused “decision-making inertia” and left the EU unable to compete with the United States and China or respond swiftly to security threats. Current Proposals and Initiatives (2026) 1. The “E6” Group Initiative In January 2026, German Finance Minister Lars Klingbeil invited his counterparts from France, Italy, Spain, Poland, and the Netherlands to form a core group (dubbed the “E6”). This proposal aims to bypass the need for consensus among all 27 member states to fast-track integration in four critical areas: Defense Spending: Streamlining joint procurement and military readiness. Savings and Investment Union: Integrating capital markets to fund European businesses. Euro Strengthening: Enhancing the Euro’s role as an international currency. Supply Chain Resilience: Securing critical raw materials. 2. The European Commission’s Deadline Commission President Ursula von der Leyen has explicitly endorsed the two-speed approach. In February 2026, she set a deadline: if a bloc-wide consensus on a “Savings and Investment Union” is not reached by the end of 2026, she will propose moving forward with a “coalition of the willing” using the Enhanced Cooperation mechanism. 3. The February 2026 “Brainstorming” Summit At an informal retreat in Belgium on February 12, 2026, EU leaders discussed how to implement “differentiated integration.” Key figures, including European Parliament President Roberta Metsola, have reframed the two-speed model not as a division, but as a “pathway to unity” that allows front-runners to lead while leaving the door open for others to join later. Key Mechanisms Being Used Rather than drafting new treaties (which is a slow process), current proposals rely on existing legal tools: Mechanism Description Enhanced Cooperation Allows at least 9 member states to establish advanced integration in a specific area without the rest of the bloc. PESCO Specific to defense, allowing a core group to deepen military cooperation. The “28th Regime” A proposed optional legal framework that businesses can choose to follow to bypass 27 different sets of national regulations. The Opposition The proposal is not without controversy. Smaller and more “fringe” [I’d sat border] member states, such as Lithuania, have criticized the move, fearing it will create “first and second-class” members and erode European solidarity. Note: While the term “two-speed Europe” is the popular label, officials often use the more technical term “differentiated integration” to make the idea sound less divisive. … Two-speed Europe could be ‘pathway to unity,’ European Parliament president Metsola tells Euronews This video provides an interview with the European Parliament President discussing how a two-speed model is being viewed as a solution to EU paralysis.
<img width="150" height="150" src="https://davelevy.info/wiki/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/BabaYagaHut-pinterest-w1080-150x150.png" class="attachment-thumbnail size-thumbnail wp-post-image" alt="an image of Baba Yaga's hut" decoding="async" loading="lazy" srcset="https://davelevy.info/wiki/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/BabaYagaHut-pinterest-w1080-150x150.png 150w, https://davelevy.info/wiki/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/BabaYagaHut-pinterest-w1080-100x100.png 100w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 150px) 100vw, 150px" />I was playing D&D last weekend, when the topic of one of my great games, played a long time ago arose. This was Baba Yaga’s Hut. A bit of googling, states that this was published in Dragon Magazine #83. I have checked my personal [paper] archive and I do not have it. So I went...
<img width="150" height="150" src="https://davelevy.info/wiki/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/BabaYagaHut-pinterest-w1080-150x150.png" class="attachment-thumbnail size-thumbnail wp-post-image" alt="an image of Baba Yaga's hut" decoding="async" loading="lazy" srcset="https://davelevy.info/wiki/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/BabaYagaHut-pinterest-w1080-150x150.png 150w, https://davelevy.info/wiki/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/BabaYagaHut-pinterest-w1080-100x100.png 100w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 150px) 100vw, 150px" /> I was playing D&D last weekend, when the topic of one of my great games, played a long time ago arose. This was Baba Yaga’s Hut. A bit of googling, states that this was published in Dragon Magazine #83. I have checked my personal [paper] archive and I do not have it. So I went to see if was available online. What I’ve found I used google gemini, and found, An article Dragon magazine #83, on the Forgotten Realms Fandom wiki, although it has no links to the game. Google point me at this internet archive page which hosts several formats, but I link to a .pdf, The Dancing Hut Of Baba Yaga credited to Lisa Smedman, not Roger Moore There’s also a version on anyflip, which credits Dave Coulson as the designer. It’s also available via RPGGeek A commentary/walk-through of the original is posted here, with their episode two also posted. This might be a bit weird for fans of fantasy as you pick up some 20th century weapons and confront a Soviet JS3 tank. We played a party of four, I think, 15th level ADD Fighter, Cleric, and Paladin with the Master of Flowers (the ,then, unique top level monk). The topology of the Hut’s interior was a tesseract; we got very lost. The featured Image is from Pinterest.
<img width="150" height="150" src="https://davelevy.info/wiki/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/pricesontheweb-kanchanara-dVAW3YDHtSw-unsplash-w1080-150x150.jpg" class="attachment-thumbnail size-thumbnail wp-post-image" alt="hands at a computer displaying stock prices" decoding="async" loading="lazy" srcset="https://davelevy.info/wiki/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/pricesontheweb-kanchanara-dVAW3YDHtSw-unsplash-w1080-150x150.jpg 150w, https://davelevy.info/wiki/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/pricesontheweb-kanchanara-dVAW3YDHtSw-unsplash-w1080-100x100.jpg 100w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 150px) 100vw, 150px" />I have collected a couple of articles about the AI stock sell off in Feb 26. Is this the beginning of the burst. And? This is a video of the AI sales pitch to Davos 26. It’s so empty I couldn’t watch it. (Tell me if I am wrong.) The Register is arguing that money...
<img width="150" height="150" src="https://davelevy.info/wiki/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/pricesontheweb-kanchanara-dVAW3YDHtSw-unsplash-w1080-150x150.jpg" class="attachment-thumbnail size-thumbnail wp-post-image" alt="hands at a computer displaying stock prices" decoding="async" loading="lazy" srcset="https://davelevy.info/wiki/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/pricesontheweb-kanchanara-dVAW3YDHtSw-unsplash-w1080-150x150.jpg 150w, https://davelevy.info/wiki/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/pricesontheweb-kanchanara-dVAW3YDHtSw-unsplash-w1080-100x100.jpg 100w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 150px) 100vw, 150px" /> I have collected a couple of articles about the AI stock sell off in Feb 26. Is this the beginning of the burst. And? US tech stocks slide as Oracle data centre setback reignites AI concerns from the FT Software sell-off over AI fears hits global stock markets, but FTSE 100 finishes at closing high on £8bn insurance takeover – as it happened from the Guardian S&P 500 tumbles nearly 1% as investors rotate out of tech, Dow slides more than 160 points: Live updates from CNBC on 3rd Feb Intensifying Tech Slide Sends Nasdaq to Worst Two-Day Drop Since April, Wall Street has been rotating out of AI leaders into real-economy stocks, from the WSJ This is a video of the AI sales pitch to Davos 26. It’s so empty I couldn’t watch it. (Tell me if I am wrong.) The Register is arguing that money is exiting the SAAS companies, not the new AI companies. And let’s remember, Cory Doctorow: What Kind of Bubble is AI? by Cory Doctorow at locusmag, where he argues that there are two types of bubble, one that leaves something useful, and one that doesn’t.
<img width="150" height="150" src="https://davelevy.info/wiki/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/male-assimar-5e-arcana-cleric-deepai_org-150x150.jpg" class="attachment-thumbnail size-thumbnail wp-post-image" alt="an armoured figure casting a spell" decoding="async" loading="lazy" srcset="https://davelevy.info/wiki/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/male-assimar-5e-arcana-cleric-deepai_org-150x150.jpg 150w, https://davelevy.info/wiki/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/male-assimar-5e-arcana-cleric-deepai_org-100x100.jpg 100w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 150px) 100vw, 150px" />I decided to make another D&D Cleric, I got fed up falling down with one of my gishes. Here are my notes. I am playing at a table that uses the 2014 rules, here is the Cleric page at dnd5e wiki. I plan to run an Assimar and DnD Beyond use the Mordenkainen Presents: Monsters...
<img width="150" height="150" src="https://davelevy.info/wiki/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/male-assimar-5e-arcana-cleric-deepai_org-150x150.jpg" class="attachment-thumbnail size-thumbnail wp-post-image" alt="an armoured figure casting a spell" decoding="async" loading="lazy" srcset="https://davelevy.info/wiki/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/male-assimar-5e-arcana-cleric-deepai_org-150x150.jpg 150w, https://davelevy.info/wiki/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/male-assimar-5e-arcana-cleric-deepai_org-100x100.jpg 100w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 150px) 100vw, 150px" /> I decided to make another D&D Cleric, I got fed up falling down with one of my gishes. Here are my notes. I am playing at a table that uses the 2014 rules, here is the Cleric page at dnd5e wiki. I plan to run an Assimar and DnD Beyond use the Mordenkainen Presents: Monsters of the Multiverse version. The PC’s sub-class/domain is the Arcana Domain sub-class. ON the D&D beyond, I need to check the number of prepared spells, which AFAIK is WIS modifier + level + the domain spells, so 8+. The Assimar special abilities, healing and radiant consumption are defined by the proficiency level. The 5th level Cleric’s ability “Destroy Undead” is not written into the character sheet. <img loading="lazy" decoding="async" width="649" height="234" src="https://davelevy.info/wiki/wp-content/uploads/2009/07/branwen-2-lb-w649.jpg" alt="a fanatsy armoured spellcaster casting a spell" class="wp-image-2355" srcset="https://davelevy.info/wiki/wp-content/uploads/2009/07/branwen-2-lb-w649.jpg 649w, https://davelevy.info/wiki/wp-content/uploads/2009/07/branwen-2-lb-w649-300x108.jpg 300w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 649px) 100vw, 649px" /> Branwen from BG1 The next spells I want are, Sanctuary (1), Command (1), Hold Person (2), Lesser Restoration (2), Silence (2), & Beacon of Hope. I suppose, Protection from Good/Evil should probably be there too. I should probably develop an “in town” prepared list. What I have is strongly healer and combat orientated and not so investigative/exploratory. I need to get on top of how to play the class, in combat, A: Shield of Faith, BA: Attack cantrip, noting that Mind Sliver places a debuff on the character making either TtD or Guiding Bolt more likely to succeed. A: Spiritual Weapon, BA: Another Attack Cantrip, or maybe Bless A: Attack Cantrip unless Cure Wounds is needed, BA: depends on A Note: that at L5 we have spirit guardians so maybe that is cast at 2, and I should check the channel divinity resource use; it might be useful in some combats. The D&D Beyond lists many spells twice in the spell list on the .pdf version of the character sheet. Google AI explains this as caused by legacy spell commitments, error handling of multi classing or domain spells. Featured Image by AI @deepai.org and the image in the text was made by me using NWN’s character builder.
<img width="150" height="150" src="https://davelevy.info/wiki/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/wizard-mm-deepai.org-w1080-150x150.jpg" class="attachment-thumbnail size-thumbnail wp-post-image" alt="A wizard casting magic missile" decoding="async" loading="lazy" srcset="https://davelevy.info/wiki/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/wizard-mm-deepai.org-w1080-150x150.jpg 150w, https://davelevy.info/wiki/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/wizard-mm-deepai.org-w1080-100x100.jpg 100w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 150px) 100vw, 150px" />To me this has always been the creation of an attack of magic darts, with each dart’s damage being evaluated by a single d4 i.e. scoring between 1 and 4, and adding an extra point of damage. One gets to roll a lot of dice. A recent statement from WOTC is that one should roll...
<img width="150" height="150" src="https://davelevy.info/wiki/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/wizard-mm-deepai.org-w1080-150x150.jpg" class="attachment-thumbnail size-thumbnail wp-post-image" alt="A wizard casting magic missile" decoding="async" loading="lazy" srcset="https://davelevy.info/wiki/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/wizard-mm-deepai.org-w1080-150x150.jpg 150w, https://davelevy.info/wiki/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/wizard-mm-deepai.org-w1080-100x100.jpg 100w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 150px) 100vw, 150px" /> To me this has always been the creation of an attack of magic darts, with each dart’s damage being evaluated by a single d4 i.e. scoring between 1 and 4, and adding an extra point of damage. One gets to roll a lot of dice. A recent statement from WOTC is that one should roll one d4 and multiply that score by the number of darts, adding one for each dart. The former rule, creates a tendency to an average of 10.5, while the latter rule evens out the probability of middling scores making the extremes of 6 and 15 more likely. Interestingly, the mean average remains the same. Image Credit: by deepai.org
<img width="150" height="150" src="https://davelevy.info/wiki/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/euukflags-roccodipoppa-unsplash-w1920x850-150x150.png" class="attachment-thumbnail size-thumbnail wp-post-image" alt="EU UK Flags" decoding="async" loading="lazy" srcset="https://davelevy.info/wiki/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/euukflags-roccodipoppa-unsplash-w1920x850-150x150.png 150w, https://davelevy.info/wiki/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/euukflags-roccodipoppa-unsplash-w1920x850-100x100.png 100w, https://davelevy.info/wiki/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/euukflags-roccodipoppa-unsplash-w1920x850-45x45.png 45w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 150px) 100vw, 150px" />Meetings have occurred in monitoring and managing the Withdrawal Agreement and Trade & Co-operation agreement, over the last month, but what did they say and agree. I’d say, not very much. As ever, links and notes … The Communique On Citizens’ Rights They say, They welcomed the solution on the true and extra cohort enshrined...
<img width="150" height="150" src="https://davelevy.info/wiki/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/euukflags-roccodipoppa-unsplash-w1920x850-150x150.png" class="attachment-thumbnail size-thumbnail wp-post-image" alt="EU UK Flags" decoding="async" loading="lazy" srcset="https://davelevy.info/wiki/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/euukflags-roccodipoppa-unsplash-w1920x850-150x150.png 150w, https://davelevy.info/wiki/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/euukflags-roccodipoppa-unsplash-w1920x850-100x100.png 100w, https://davelevy.info/wiki/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/euukflags-roccodipoppa-unsplash-w1920x850-45x45.png 45w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 150px) 100vw, 150px" /> Meetings have occurred in monitoring and managing the Withdrawal Agreement and Trade & Co-operation agreement, over the last month, but what did they say and agree. I’d say, not very much. As ever, links and notes … The Communique Landing Page for a Joint Statement by European Commissioner Maroš Šefčovič and Minister for the Cabinet Office Nick Thomas-Symonds Joint statement by the European Commissioner, Maroš Šefčovič and the UK Minister for the Cabinet Office, Nick Thomas-Symonds, the text of the statement. On Citizens’ Rights They say, They welcomed the solution on the true and extra cohort enshrined in UK law and agreed to accelerate the transition from temporary to permanent residence of these citizens. They committed to further strengthen their cooperation on all pending citizens’ rights issues. So what is the true and extra cohort? Google gemini says, and I paraphrase, the Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Act’s Clause 42 is designed to resolve the inconsistencies of the UK’s treatment of EU citizens vs the commitments made in the Withdrawal Agreement. I wonder if this will lead the EU to withdraw the two immigration related, infringement proceedings. Google says that the Commission are still proceeding with a court case. This is what the Commission has to say, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_24_6144 . The Independent Monitoring Agency has also issued a press release, https://ima-citizensrights.org.uk/border-security-asylum-and-immigration-bill-clause-42/ . This would seem to be rectifying disgraceful decisions taken by the Home Office/Home Secretary immediately after Brexit. There are still some loopholes in the coverage. What is true and extra? https://share.google/aimode/2cOkaKdoJ6a2FU4xi What does Clause 42 do https://share.google/aimode/lEnaex7EDJuPBOUWr On Trade They note progress and anticipate more and much of the focus is GB/NI trade and the EU’s right of inspection. This is another point of friction and a source of some of the other infringement proceedings. They also took looked at the potential implications of the (EU’s) Artificial Intelligence and Cyber Resilience Acts and agreed to continue to talk. On Cyprus It seems that the legal work in meeting the agreement already made needs to be completed. This is about the government and law enforcement on the UK military bases in Cyprus. (Why don’t we just withdraw?). Trade & Co-operation Agreement This section of the communique is a noting of progress made since May 25. These include agreements on Fisheries, and Erasmus. The meeting also anticipated further work on energy co-operation and finalising the agreements on Youth exchange, SPS and a common emissions trading scheme. In the area of trade and the economy, the co-chairs exchanged views on global challenges, including measures relating to global steel overcapacity, economic and supply chain security, and parties’ respective industrial policy measures. They also discussed the development and implementation of their respective Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanisms. They reference a third UK-EU dialogue on Cyber issues in December 2025, and discussed the next steps towards progressing cooperation on cyber security. I need to see what they said. They also anticipated the Treaty reviews, which one might hope is quicker than progress on the reset. I say This is thin gruel, making the most of what has already been agreed and congratulating themselves on the slow progress of the reset agenda. The immigration reforms are to be welcomed. Meanwhile, we note UK EU divergence tracker Q4 2025 from UK iCE who note the divergence in the UK, on financial services regulation and by the EU on climate impact reporting and regulation of AI and social media.
<img width="150" height="150" src="https://davelevy.info/wiki/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/wp-2-hugo-150x150.jpg" class="attachment-thumbnail size-thumbnail wp-post-image" alt="a cartoon made by ai, an arrow pointing from wordpress to a blue gopher." decoding="async" loading="lazy" srcset="https://davelevy.info/wiki/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/wp-2-hugo-150x150.jpg 150w, https://davelevy.info/wiki/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/wp-2-hugo-100x100.jpg 100w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 150px) 100vw, 150px" />Really? The performance from my WP hosting provider is consistently poor, althouhg I don’t seem to have suffered a DOS since installing the CDN package. I don’t want a database on my Pi as it complicates build maintenance. Is Hugo the answer? NB I use a lot of plugins and thus, wordpress.org would be too...
<img width="150" height="150" src="https://davelevy.info/wiki/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/wp-2-hugo-150x150.jpg" class="attachment-thumbnail size-thumbnail wp-post-image" alt="a cartoon made by ai, an arrow pointing from wordpress to a blue gopher." decoding="async" loading="lazy" srcset="https://davelevy.info/wiki/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/wp-2-hugo-150x150.jpg 150w, https://davelevy.info/wiki/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/wp-2-hugo-100x100.jpg 100w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 150px) 100vw, 150px" /> Really? The performance from my WP hosting provider is consistently poor, althouhg I don’t seem to have suffered a DOS since installing the CDN package. I don’t want a database on my Pi as it complicates build maintenance. Is Hugo the answer? NB I use a lot of plugins and thus, wordpress.org would be too expensive. What I found? https://blog.muffn.io/posts/how-i-migrated-from-wordpress-to-hugo/, suggests that Github Pages is a good hosting tool. Several tools at WP Migrations at gohugo.io See also https://davelevy.info/wiki/hugo & https://davelevy.info/wiki/tag/wordpress Featured image by deepai.org
<img width="150" height="150" src="https://davelevy.info/wiki/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/cybersecurity-flyd-mT7lXZPjk7U-unsplash-150x150.jpg" class="attachment-thumbnail size-thumbnail wp-post-image" alt="a lock and keyboard" decoding="async" loading="lazy" srcset="https://davelevy.info/wiki/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/cybersecurity-flyd-mT7lXZPjk7U-unsplash-150x150.jpg 150w, https://davelevy.info/wiki/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/cybersecurity-flyd-mT7lXZPjk7U-unsplash-100x100.jpg 100w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 150px) 100vw, 150px" />My notes and links Google Gemini says, UK Cyber Security and Resilience Bill (2025/2026) proposes strengthening national infrastructure security by expanding the scope of the NIS Regulations to cover more digital service providers, critical suppliers, and data centers. It introduces stricter incident reporting requirements (within 24 hours), mandatory risk management, and increased enforcement powers for...
<img width="150" height="150" src="https://davelevy.info/wiki/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/cybersecurity-flyd-mT7lXZPjk7U-unsplash-150x150.jpg" class="attachment-thumbnail size-thumbnail wp-post-image" alt="a lock and keyboard" decoding="async" loading="lazy" srcset="https://davelevy.info/wiki/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/cybersecurity-flyd-mT7lXZPjk7U-unsplash-150x150.jpg 150w, https://davelevy.info/wiki/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/cybersecurity-flyd-mT7lXZPjk7U-unsplash-100x100.jpg 100w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 150px) 100vw, 150px" /> My notes and links Google Gemini says, UK Cyber Security and Resilience Bill (2025/2026) proposes strengthening national infrastructure security by expanding the scope of the NIS Regulations to cover more digital service providers, critical suppliers, and data centers. It introduces stricter incident reporting requirements (within 24 hours), mandatory risk management, and increased enforcement powers for regulators to protect essential services. See here. Also, “The legislation, introduced to Parliament on November 12, 2025, aims to modernize the UK’s, and in particular critical sectors’, defense against rising cyber threats, as described in the UK Parliament news release and GOV.UK press release.” Cyber Security and Resilience (NIS) Bill, introduced to Parliament on November 12, 2025, does not explicitly mandate specific frameworks like ISO 27001 or COBIT in law. Instead, it requires “appropriate and proportionate” technical and organizational measures. See here. Note the US spelling of organizational, rather underlines the need for digital sovereignty. See also https://davelevy.info/wiki/date-use-access-act/
<img width="150" height="150" src="https://davelevy.info/wiki/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/computerhall-ismailenes-ayhan-lVZjvw-u9V8-unsplash-w1080-150x150.jpg" class="attachment-thumbnail size-thumbnail wp-post-image" alt="an aisle in a computer hall" decoding="async" loading="lazy" srcset="https://davelevy.info/wiki/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/computerhall-ismailenes-ayhan-lVZjvw-u9V8-unsplash-w1080-150x150.jpg 150w, https://davelevy.info/wiki/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/computerhall-ismailenes-ayhan-lVZjvw-u9V8-unsplash-w1080-100x100.jpg 100w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 150px) 100vw, 150px" />What is the architecture of an AI Cluster and how does it differ from other distributed computing architectures? These are my notes, a work in progress. Schwartz (or someone that advised him) articulated that there were three super-architectures, Virtualisation Hosts, Web Farm servers, and Super-computers. In my article on IS Strategy, on LinkedIn, (April 2020)...
<img width="150" height="150" src="https://davelevy.info/wiki/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/computerhall-ismailenes-ayhan-lVZjvw-u9V8-unsplash-w1080-150x150.jpg" class="attachment-thumbnail size-thumbnail wp-post-image" alt="an aisle in a computer hall" decoding="async" loading="lazy" srcset="https://davelevy.info/wiki/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/computerhall-ismailenes-ayhan-lVZjvw-u9V8-unsplash-w1080-150x150.jpg 150w, https://davelevy.info/wiki/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/computerhall-ismailenes-ayhan-lVZjvw-u9V8-unsplash-w1080-100x100.jpg 100w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 150px) 100vw, 150px" /> What is the architecture of an AI Cluster and how does it differ from other distributed computing architectures? These are my notes, a work in progress. Schwartz (or someone that advised him) articulated that there were three super-architectures, Virtualisation Hosts, Web Farm servers, and Super-computers. In my article on IS Strategy, on LinkedIn, (April 2020) I described them as Today I describe the systems as business systems, community systems and High Performance Computing. I hadn’t realised that it was that old. It would seem that now I have to add AI clusters as 4th super-architecture. I asked ChatGPT, who now it seems serve AI with ads, who said A supercomputer is engineered to solve physics equations about reality with extreme precision, while an AI cluster node is engineered to multiply giant matrices as fast as physically possible to train neural networks. And “AI doesn’t usually need extreme numerical precision — it needs throughput.” They use different interconnects Power and power density are different, AI systems draw more power, with a higher density and thus require more expensive cooling. Different RAM and Chips I looked for white papers, and found these https://insideainews.com/2019/11/27/supercomputers-and-machine-learning-a-perfect-match/ https://www.ibm.com/think/topics/hpc https://www.glennklockwood.com/garden/HPC-vs-AI, Glenn works for VASTdata, previously at Microsoft. In order to understand the software models, I asked gemini, , and it answered with this. More to read.