{"id":5317,"date":"2020-10-14T17:39:51","date_gmt":"2020-10-14T17:39:51","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/davelevy.info\/wiki\/?p=5317"},"modified":"2024-08-15T09:00:20","modified_gmt":"2024-08-15T09:00:20","slug":"uk-defence-review-2020","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/davelevy.info\/wiki\/uk-defence-review-2020\/","title":{"rendered":"UK Defence Review 2020"},"content":{"rendered":"\n<p>Thinking about defence policy, there&#8217;s going to be another review. This started as a collection of articles leaked or inspired probably by senior army officers but in Nov. Johnson made a financial announcement seemingly in advance of the review announcement which led to me doing some reading and looking at previous strategic reviews, the armed services pay review board report, and further technology reviews. I suppose the question is do we know what we&#8217;re doing, and I think the answer is &#8220;No&#8221;. But at least they&#8217;re <acronym title=\"that waited until 2022\">not dressing up in camouflage greens<\/acronym>. For me, the first thing that is required is a threat analysis, it all stems from there and I don&#8217;t think the Tories who have been in charge for the last 10 years have it right because amongst other things, they&#8217;re fucked over the EU &amp; NATO. Anyway, here are my notes and links.<br><\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--more-->\n\n\n\n<hr class=\"wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity\"\/>\n\n\n\n<p><p style=\"font-size: 120%;\"><a href=\".\/#openingskirmishes\">Opening Skirmishes<\/a> | <a href=\".\/tanks\">Tanks <\/a> | Cummings | The pre-announcement of the 2021 Review | The Integrated Defence Review | Previous White Papers | New Money | Manpower | Assets &amp; Capability | <a href=\".\/#leadership\">Leadership &amp; Doctrine<\/a> | <a href=\".\/#spring24\">Waiting for Starmer<\/a><\/p><\/p>\n\n\n\n<hr class=\"wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity\"\/>\n\n\n\n<p><a name=\"openingskirmishes\"><\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\">Marines, Tanks and Infantry<\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p>Before a review, the various branches will leak stories, emphasising their importance&nbsp; and exaggerating the threat to their capability; I collected a few on the Tanks and Marines.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Will we keep the Marines and Tanks?<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ol class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li><a href=\"https:\/\/www.csis.org\/analysis\/uk-integrated-security-and-defense-review-opportunity-amid-chaos\">https:\/\/www.csis.org\/analysis\/uk-integrated-security-and-defense-review-opportunity-amid-chaos<\/a><\/li>\n\n\n\n<li><a href=\"https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20230603172103\/https:\/\/jia.sipa.columbia.edu\/online-articles\/empire-strikes-back-post-brexit-britains-return-east-suez\">The Empire Strikes Back: Post-Brexit Britain\u2019s Return to East of Suez<\/a>, this is very good, he or she got there first. &#8216;Frederick the Great once said, \u201cHe who defends everywhere defends nothing.\u201d A feeble and overstretched global military presence is equal to no presence at all.&#8217;<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li><a href=\"https:\/\/www.gov.uk\/government\/speeches\/chief-of-the-defence-staff-general-sir-nick-carter-launches-the-integrated-operating-concept\">https:\/\/www.gov.uk\/government\/speeches\/chief-of-the-defence-staff-general-sir-nick-carter-launches-the-integrated-operating-concept<\/a><\/li>\n\n\n\n<li><a href=\"https:\/\/www.dailymaverick.co.za\/article\/2020-11-24-revealed-the-uk-militarys-overseas-base-network-involves-145-sites-in-42-countries\/\">REVEALED: The UK military\u2019s overseas base network involves 145 sites in 42 countries<\/a>&nbsp;showing the UK Military footprint,&nbsp; from the Daily Maverick<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>, The recent war in Nagorno-Karabakh, fought between Armenia and Azerbaijan, may well be <a href=\"https:\/\/capx.co\/the-war-in-nagorno-karabakh-has-big-lessons-for-the-british-army\/\">an unusually fruitful seminar for the armies of the West<\/a>.&nbsp;Without getting too deep into the tactical weeds, this &#8230; illustrates that the holes in the British Army\u2019s current arsenal are very severe indeed: minimal short-range air defence and electronic warfare capabilities \u2013 both critical to fight enemy UAS \u2013 and no loitering munitions of its own. Much of its artillery is out ranged and obsolete, while its malfunctioning reconnaissance drone \u2013 Watchkeeper \u2013 stars in a charmingly forthright NASA case study of failed public sector technology development.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li><a href=\"https:\/\/www.rand.org\/pubs\/monographs\/MG240.html\">RAND on the aircraft carriers<\/a> &#8230; 75% of cost is post launch<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li><a href=\"https:\/\/www.theguardian.com\/uk-news\/2018\/feb\/04\/royal-marines-cuts-undermine-security-mps-defence-committee\">On the Marines<\/a> &#8230; a puff leak, they&#8217;ll probably stay, somewhere it says they&#8217;ll refocus on seaborne, commando work and defocus on light infantry.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n\n\n\n<p><a name=\"tanks\"><\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><script> function maxdisplay() {<br \/>\n  var x = document.getElementById(\"tanks\");<br \/>\n  if (x.style.display === \"none\") {<br \/>\n    x.style.display = \"block\";<br \/>\n  } else {<br \/>\n    x.style.display = \"none\";<br \/>\n  }<br \/>\n}<br \/>\n<\/script><br><button onclick=\"maxdisplay()\">View\/Hide Tanks <\/button><\/p>\n\n\n\n<div id=\"tanks\" style=\"display: none;\">\n<h3>Tanks<\/h3>\n<p>One of the rumours is that they planned to scrap the Tanks, here is a rebuttal; <a href=\"https:\/\/wavellroom.com\/2020\/10\/08\/survive-the-case-for-armour\/\">The case for armour<\/a>&nbsp; &#8230;&nbsp; &#8220;It is true that some modern conflicts differ from those in the past, there is no evidence that the character of war has fundamentally changed to the point where armoured warfare is certain never to return.&#8221;<\/p>\n<p>Here&#8217;s a <a href=\"https:\/\/youtu.be\/T-DIii0iOyU\">video on dropping the Armour<\/a>, by Matsimus, he&#8217;s good on the intellectual threats to armour, talks of sunset\/sunrise weapons, which means they need the money for new toys. These new investments are not replacements and he argues the whole armoured investment programme has been delayed for years. The denouement: based on <a href=\"https:\/\/www.independent.co.uk\/news\/uk\/home-news\/british-army-tanks-uk-defence-review-ben-wallace-nato-b431482.html\">a press statement<\/a> from MOD that the UK would not be reducing the <acronym title=\"227\">number of Tanks<\/acronym>, and <a href=\"https:\/\/www.defensenews.com\/global\/europe\/2021\/03\/22\/who-are-the-winners-and-losers-in-britains-new-defense-review\/\">a summary of the review by Defence News<\/a>, which on Tanks says,<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>The Army is upgrading the Challenger 2 tank fleet at a cost of \u00a31.3 billion, but only 148 vehicles will be improved.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>For more on Tanks see, <a href=\"https:\/\/davelevy.info\/wiki\/tanks\/\">https:\/\/davelevy.info\/wiki\/tanks\/<\/a><\/p>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\">Cummings<\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p>Here&#8217;s some stuff on Cummings&#8217; involvement,<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ol class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li><a href=\"https:\/\/www.theguardian.com\/politics\/2020\/aug\/13\/mps-ask-no-10-to-clarify-dominic-cummings-role-in-defence-review\">MPs ask No 10 to clarify Dominic Cummings role in defence review<\/a><\/li>\n\n\n\n<li><a href=\"https:\/\/www.theguardian.com\/politics\/2020\/jul\/08\/dominic-cummings-to-tour-sensitive-mod-sites-amid-defence-review\">Dominic Cummings to tour sensitive MoD sites amid defence review <\/a><\/li>\n\n\n\n<li><a href=\"https:\/\/www.theguardian.com\/politics\/2020\/sep\/15\/cummings-seen-with-letter-on-1980s-us-military-reorganisation?fbclid=IwAR3YNFTPB1XfR8tDBQ7tmpB7awYhk5OKFRgbwL-oy0nHbZqAnR-w9nx6iys\">Cummings seen with letter on 1980s US military reorganisation<\/a>&nbsp;NB this is 40 years old doctrine<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li><a href=\"https:\/\/www.theguardian.com\/politics\/2019\/nov\/03\/dominic-cummings-labour-questions-russia-links\">Is Cummings a Russian asset?<\/a><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\">2020\/1 Review<\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p>Cummings <a href=\"https:\/\/www.theguardian.com\/politics\/2020\/nov\/13\/dominic-cummings-has-already-left-job-at-no-10-reports\">has been fired<\/a> so where does this leave the Defence Review? It seems in a very healthy, if not accelerated state. Boris had to make an announcement, and did so, stating that the Defence budget was to increase by \u00a316\u00bdbn but added a bullshit justification about the pride of the nation, and a reversing of decades of cuts. We need to note that it&#8217;s Johnson, that has <span style=\"text-decoration: underline;\"><strong>reversed the decision to withdraw <\/strong><\/span>from &#8220;East of Suez&#8221; although it was Brown who ordered the Aircraft carriers that have no other use. [<a href=\"https:\/\/www.independent.co.uk\/news\/uk\/politics\/boris-johnson-military-spending-speech-b1743855.html\">Independent<\/a> || <a href=\"https:\/\/www.theguardian.com\/politics\/2020\/nov\/18\/boris-johnson-agrees-16bn-rise-in-defence-spending\">Guardian<\/a>] Kier Starmer&#8217;s comments are accurate here, strategy follows a threat analysis and programmes follow strategy. Johnson offers neither.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-embed is-type-video is-provider-youtube wp-block-embed-youtube wp-embed-aspect-16-9 wp-has-aspect-ratio\"><div class=\"wp-block-embed__wrapper\">\n<iframe loading=\"lazy\" title=\"Boris Johnson grants extra \u00a316.5bn for defence spending in biggest investment since Cold War\" width=\"1099\" height=\"618\" src=\"https:\/\/www.youtube.com\/embed\/rIj0g80nxlw?feature=oembed\" frameborder=\"0\" allow=\"accelerometer; autoplay; clipboard-write; encrypted-media; gyroscope; picture-in-picture; web-share\" referrerpolicy=\"strict-origin-when-cross-origin\" allowfullscreen><\/iframe>\n<\/div><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<p>The press stories still suggest a reduction in tanks and army personnel, a good head line summary is <a title=\"Who are the winners and losers in Britain\u2019s new defence review?\" href=\"https:\/\/www.defensenews.com\/global\/europe\/2021\/03\/22\/who-are-the-winners-and-losers-in-britains-new-defense-review\/\">here in &#8220;Defence News&#8221;<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>At the time of the paper&#8217;s publication, the HoC Library published a document called, &#8220;<a href=\"https:\/\/commonslibrary.parliament.uk\/research-briefings\/cbp-7313\/\">A brief guide to previous British defence reviews<\/a>&#8220;. (To be read)<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\">Global Britain in a Competitive Age: the Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy<\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p>Here&#8217;s <a href=\"https:\/\/www.gov.uk\/government\/publications\/global-britain-in-a-competitive-age-the-integrated-review-of-security-defence-development-and-foreign-policy\">the Govt SDR hosting<\/a> page and here is <a href=\"https:\/\/threadreaderapp.com\/thread\/1373766194927394821.html\">a thread by Dr Phil Weir about the Indian Ocean<\/a>. (An OPV stands for Offshore Patrol Vessel, is between 1,00 &amp; 2,200 tons, so small, but in use by the Thai Navy.)<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The Govt&#8217;s hosting page says, and this is heavily edited for the sake of brevity,<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p>In this context, the Integrated Review sets out four overarching objectives:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ol class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li><strong>Sustaining strategic advantage through science and technology (S&amp;T)<\/strong>, &#8230; to firmly establish the UK as a global S&amp;T and responsible cyber power<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li><strong>Shaping the open international order of the future<\/strong>, working with partners to reinvigorate the international institutions, &#8230;<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li><strong>Strengthening security and defence at home and overseas<\/strong>, working with allies and partners &#8230;<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li><strong>Building resilience at home and overseas<\/strong>, improving our ability to anticipate, prevent, prepare for and respond &#8230; will also involve tackling risks at source \u2013 in particular climate change and biodiversity loss.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<p>In Foundation and Empire, there is a diplomat who visits the Foundation and spend a number of days there, what he says and promises is analysed using the mathematical tools of &#8220;psychohistory&#8221; and they discover, he&#8217;s said nothing! You don&#8217;t need the tools to analyse a similar content to the paragraph above.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>More ships, less soldiers, reduced war (ground) fighting capability.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Ben Wallace&#8217;s forward identifies the <a href=\"https:\/\/www.gov.uk\/government\/publications\/the-integrated-operating-concept-2025\">Integrated Operating Concept<\/a> as a key step towards the review outcome.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Here&#8217;s some links to help understand the army cuts,<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ol class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>https:\/\/www.nam.ac.uk\/explore\/what-are-special-forces<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>https:\/\/www.army.mod.uk\/who-we-are\/formations-divisions-brigades\/<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>https:\/\/www.nam.ac.uk\/explore\/army-organisation<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li><a href=\"https:\/\/www.army.mod.uk\/who-we-are\/our-people\/command-structure\/\">https:\/\/www.army.mod.uk\/who-we-are\/our-people\/command-structure\/<\/a> identifies 1 Division as UK based, and heads up the British Army\u2019s Light Role Adaptable Force, optimised for the challenges of today, both at home and abroad. With approximately 14,000 Regular and 11,000 Army Reserve soldiers, the Division is configured to deliver \u2018light role excellence\u2019. This page also identifies 3 Division as a war fighting division with armour at its centre, and 6 division consisting of Cyber, and Special Operations forces.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n\n\n\n<p>Here&#8217;s a supplementary white paper on defence, <a href=\"https:\/\/www.gov.uk\/government\/publications\/mod-science-and-technology-strategy-2020\">MOD Science and Technology Strategy 2020 <\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p>The MOD S&amp;T strategy sets out the aim to prioritise higher-risk, high reward research that will support the generation-after-next of military capabilities while continuing to maintain the range of critical S&amp;T capabilities that supports our national security.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<p>Here&#8217;s a <a href=\"https:\/\/www.ft.com\/content\/413f6ce6-c66c-4916-bb5c-c59f1f7bb81c?shareType=nongift\">review<\/a> in the FT, one year later and one month after Russia invaded Ukraine.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p>&#8220;What does need to change is the review\u2019s \u201cfrankly insulting indifference to European partners and\u2009.\u2009.\u2009.\u2009the necessity, and opportunity, of playing a much better game on European security,\u201d said Professor Michael Clarke, former director of the Royal United Services Institute, a London think-tank.<br>&#8230;<br>Rishi Sunak, the UK chancellor, last week resisted growing pressure to increase the defence budget in the Spring Statement, despite rising inflation. As a result Malcolm Chalmers, RUSI\u2019s deputy-director general, said defence spending would decline in real terms over the next three years.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\">What came before?<\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p>The House of Commons helpfully published a paper called, <a href=\"https:\/\/researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk\/documents\/CBP-7313\/CBP-7313.pdf\">A brief guide to previous British defence reviews.<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Blair&#8217;s Govt had two reviews, one&nbsp; in <a title=\"on wikipedia\" href=\"https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Strategic_Defence_Review\">1998<\/a>,&nbsp; see also the <a href=\"https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20220526200327\/https:\/\/researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk\/documents\/RP98-91\/RP98-91.pdf\">HoC Library research paper<\/a> on 1998, and its <a href=\"https:\/\/commonslibrary.parliament.uk\/research-briefings\/rp98-91\/\">HoC Library landing page<\/a>. See also the <a href=\"https:\/\/webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk\/ukgwa\/20121018172816\/http:\/www.mod.uk\/NR\/rdonlyres\/65F3D7AC-4340-4119-93A2-20825848E50E\/0\/sdr1998_complete.pdf\">now archived White Paper<\/a>. See also <a href=\"https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Delivering_Security_in_a_Changing_World\">2003<\/a>&nbsp;which was supplemented by &#8220;A new chapter&#8221;, itself <a href=\"https:\/\/publications.parliament.uk\/pa\/cm200203\/cmselect\/cmdfence\/93\/93.pdf\">commented<\/a> on by the MoD Select committee.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>These were&nbsp; followed by Cameron in <a href=\"https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Strategic_Defence_and_Security_Review_2010\">2010<\/a>, and then again in <a href=\"https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Strategic_Defence_and_Security_Review_2015\">2015<\/a>. In preparation for the 2021 review, the HOC Library <a href=\"https:\/\/commonslibrary.parliament.uk\/research-briefings\/cbp-7313\/\">published<\/a>, <a href=\"https:\/\/commonslibrary.parliament.uk\/research-briefings\/cbp-7313\/\">A brief guide to previous British defence reviews<\/a>&nbsp;dated 2020.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\">1998<\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p>From 1998 paper<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p><span dir=\"ltr\" role=\"presentation\">Central to these new strategic realities was the assessment that \u201cthere is today no <\/span><span dir=\"ltr\" role=\"presentation\">direct military threat to the United Kingdom or Western Europe\u201d.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p>Its overall strategic conclusions were that the <a title=\"British Armed Forces\" href=\"https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/British_Armed_Forces\">British Armed Forces<\/a> should be able to respond to <span style=\"text-decoration: underline;\">a major international crisis which might require a military effort and combat operations of a similar scale and duration<\/span> to <a title=\"Operation Granby\" href=\"https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Operation_Granby\">Operation Granby<\/a> during the <a title=\"Gulf War\" href=\"https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Gulf_War\">Gulf War<\/a>. It also should be able to undertake a more extended overseas deployment on a lesser scale (as in <a class=\"mw-redirect\" title=\"SFOR\" href=\"https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/SFOR\">Bosnia<\/a>) while retaining the ability to mount a second substantial deployment &#8211; which might involve a combat brigade and appropriate naval and air forces &#8211; if this were made necessary by a second crisis (as in <a title=\"Operation Veritas\" href=\"https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Operation_Veritas\">Operation Veritas<\/a> in <a title=\"Afghanistan\" href=\"https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Afghanistan\">Afghanistan<\/a>). It would not, however, expect both deployments to involve warfighting or to maintain them simultaneously for longer than six months. The Armed Forces must also retain the ability, at much longer notice, to rebuild a bigger (pre-<a title=\"Options for Change\" href=\"https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Options_for_Change\">Options for Change<\/a>) force as part of <a title=\"NATO\" href=\"https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/NATO\">NATO<\/a>&#8216;s collective defence should a major strategic threat re-emerge.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<p>From the Research Paper, a warning about expeditionary engagements,<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p>The confirmation of an expeditionary strategy is also open to debate. Britain has fought a series of expeditionary and &#8220;withdrawal from empire&#8221; campaigns overseas since the end of the Second World War. These engagements have generally been successful and have resulted in very few casualties. In contrast, other states which have followed an interventionist foreign policy have suffered heavy casualties and, on occasion, major defeat. The USA lost over 100,000 men in Korea and Vietnam combined. France lost similar numbers in Vietnam and Algeria. Whether it is under UN auspices or in concert with the USA, the UK could be committing itself to future conflicts which could turn out to be domestically divisive and costly, both in terms of expenditure and in lives.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<p>On Blair&#8217;s policy, a critique is <a title=\"The Development of British Defence Policy: Blair, Brown and Beyond. By David Brown, ed. (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing, a review.\" href=\"https:\/\/digitalcommons.usf.edu\/cgi\/viewcontent.cgi?article=1147&amp;context=jss\">here<\/a>. A turn toward Europe but a recognition that the British Military could not operate outside Europe without US support.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\">2003<\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p>On the 2003 paper, <span id=\"page69R_mcid9\" class=\"markedContent\"><span dir=\"ltr\" role=\"presentation\">Bronwen Maddox, then Foreign Editor<\/span><br role=\"presentation\"><span dir=\"ltr\" role=\"presentation\">at<\/span> <span dir=\"ltr\" role=\"presentation\">The Times<\/span> <span dir=\"ltr\" role=\"presentation\">commented, <\/span><\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p>The biggest gamble taken in the White Paper is that this view of future wars is correct. On this view, the wars that will demand British engagement in the next couple of decades are likely to resemble those of the 1990s \u2013 Bosnia, Sierra Leone, Kosovo. Or they will resemble those of this century \u2013 Afghanistan and Iraq \u2013 and will be fought alongside the US. But they will not be like the Falklands, the Cold War or the Second World War<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<p>Apart from its focus on networked warfare and anti-terrorism, this quote sums the paper up as far as I can see.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\">2010<\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p>Also see below, wikipedia identifies not threat or capability statement and states,<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p>On 3 August 2011, the <a title=\"House of Commons of the United Kingdom\" href=\"https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/House_of_Commons_of_the_United_Kingdom\">House of Commons<\/a> <a title=\"Defence Select Committee\" href=\"https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Defence_Select_Committee\">Defence Select Committee<\/a> <a href=\"https:\/\/publications.parliament.uk\/pa\/cm201012\/cmselect\/cmdfence\/761\/761.pdf\">published<\/a> a critical review of the SDSR. The review led to wide-ranging cuts to the Armed Forces, which were widely criticised for damaging the capabilities of the British military.<sup id=\"cite_ref-27\" class=\"reference\"><a href=\"https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Strategic_Defence_and_Security_Review_2010#cite_note-27\">[27]<\/a><\/sup><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\">2015<\/h4>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p>The National Security Risk Assessment 2015 found the threats faced by the UK, including its Overseas Territories and overseas interests, have &#8220;increased in scale, diversity and complexity&#8221; since 2010. It highlighted four particular threats that are likely to be priorities for UK security in the coming decade:<sup id=\"cite_ref-SDSR2015_2-0\" class=\"reference\"><\/sup><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<ol class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>The increasing threat posed by terrorism, extremism and instability.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>The resurgence of state-based threats; and intensifying wider state competition.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>The impact of technology, especially cyber threats; and wider technological developments.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>The erosion of the rules-based international order, making it harder to build consensus and tackle global threats.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<p>An NAO report on Budget management 2016 was <a href=\"https:\/\/www.nao.org.uk\/wp-content\/uploads\/2016\/06\/Impact-of-the-Strategic-Defence-and-Security-Review-on-the-Equipment-Plan.pdf\">published<\/a>. It documents the capital spend as 40% and staff\/people costs as 31% of budget. It summarises the 2025 goals as,<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p><span id=\"page46R_mcid198\" class=\"markedContent\"><span dir=\"ltr\" role=\"presentation\">It sets out three national security objectives:<\/span><\/span><span id=\"page46R_mcid199\" class=\"markedContent\"><br role=\"presentation\"><span dir=\"ltr\" role=\"presentation\">\u2022<\/span><\/span><span id=\"page46R_mcid200\" class=\"markedContent\"><span dir=\"ltr\" role=\"presentation\">to protect the people of the UK, both at home and abroad;<\/span><\/span><span id=\"page46R_mcid201\" class=\"markedContent\"><br role=\"presentation\"><span dir=\"ltr\" role=\"presentation\">\u2022<\/span><\/span><span id=\"page46R_mcid202\" class=\"markedContent\"><span dir=\"ltr\" role=\"presentation\">to project the UK\u2019s global influence; and<\/span><\/span><span id=\"page46R_mcid203\" class=\"markedContent\"><br role=\"presentation\"><span dir=\"ltr\" role=\"presentation\">\u2022<\/span><\/span><span id=\"page46R_mcid204\" class=\"markedContent\"><span dir=\"ltr\" role=\"presentation\">to promote the UK\u2019s national prosperity \u2013 this is a new strategic objective <\/span><\/span><span id=\"page46R_mcid205\" class=\"markedContent\"><span dir=\"ltr\" role=\"presentation\">for the Ministry of Defence.<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<p>It also talks about the replacement subs for the Vanguard class ICBM launch platforms. Are we already spending money on these?<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a name=\"2010\"><\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\">The dire problems of the 2010 SDR<\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p>Johnson side stepped the allegation that it was <a href=\"https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Strategic_Defence_Review\">Cameron&#8217;s 2010 SDR<\/a> that fucked things up, although I would add the decision by Labour to build two &#8220;fleet&#8221; aircraft carriers, as part of the problem. Here is <a href=\"https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20101105225649\/http:\/\/www.parliament.uk\/briefingpapers\/commons\/lib\/research\/briefings\/snia-05592.pdf\">a House of Commons Research Paper on the 2010 SDR<\/a>, hosted on the wayback machine, full of statements on the political direction &#x1f633;. This quote is quite amusing,<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p>Equipment programmes cannot be based on wish-lists or the fantasy world of what we would like to do if resources were unlimited.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<p>Cameron&#8217;s review, confirmed a further shrinking of the Army, and cuts to the number of tanks, self-propelled guns and the withdrawal from Germany. It confirmed cuts to the surface fleet, and shit-canned the Harriers. The aftermath of this review led me to say that the armed forces now had aircraft carriers without warplanes, a tank regiment without tanks, a guided missile destroyer without missiles, a fighter bomber too old to use and the smallest army in living memory incapable of successfully fighting an expeditionary force, certainly alone, I should have added transport command without transports, but we had four ICBM submarines.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>I have written on the state of the 2010 review<\/p>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-embed is-type-wp-embed is-provider-davelevy-info-wiki wp-block-embed-davelevy-info-wiki\"><div class=\"wp-block-embed__wrapper\">\n<blockquote class=\"wp-embedded-content\" data-secret=\"LTvH5ilpbB\"><a href=\"https:\/\/davelevy.info\/wiki\/defending-the-uk\/\">Defending the UK<\/a><\/blockquote><iframe loading=\"lazy\" class=\"wp-embedded-content\" sandbox=\"allow-scripts\" security=\"restricted\" style=\"position: absolute; clip: rect(1px, 1px, 1px, 1px);\" title=\"&#8220;Defending the UK&#8221; &#8212; davelevy . info \/ wiki\" src=\"https:\/\/davelevy.info\/wiki\/defending-the-uk\/embed\/#?secret=quBufAzrZY#?secret=LTvH5ilpbB\" data-secret=\"LTvH5ilpbB\" width=\"600\" height=\"338\" frameborder=\"0\" marginwidth=\"0\" marginheight=\"0\" scrolling=\"no\"><\/iframe>\n<\/div><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<p>and also on my blog<\/p>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-embed is-type-wp-embed is-provider-davelevy-info wp-block-embed-davelevy-info\"><div class=\"wp-block-embed__wrapper\">\n<blockquote class=\"wp-embedded-content\" data-secret=\"L8cK7oMl1V\"><a href=\"https:\/\/davelevy.info\/on-trident-renewal\/\">On Trident Renewal<\/a><\/blockquote><iframe loading=\"lazy\" class=\"wp-embedded-content\" sandbox=\"allow-scripts\" security=\"restricted\" style=\"position: absolute; clip: rect(1px, 1px, 1px, 1px);\" title=\"&#8220;On Trident Renewal&#8221; &#8212; davelevy.info\" src=\"https:\/\/davelevy.info\/on-trident-renewal\/embed\/#?secret=kBsF3RsCC9#?secret=L8cK7oMl1V\" data-secret=\"L8cK7oMl1V\" width=\"600\" height=\"338\" frameborder=\"0\" marginwidth=\"0\" marginheight=\"0\" scrolling=\"no\"><\/iframe>\n<\/div><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\">What is Johnson&#8217;s new money buying?<\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p>I was curious to see what had happened to Soldier&#8217;s Pay. It is not easily available on google. I did find <a href=\"https:\/\/www.gov.uk\/government\/publications\/armed-forces-pay-review-body-forty-eighth-report-2019\">the 48th report of the Armed Forces Pay Review Board<\/a> which recommended a further 2.9% pay increase despite being leaned on to take on board affordability; I hope the people get their share of the \u00a316\u00bdbn.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>However, with help from my MP, Vicky Foxcroft, I obtained some numbers on Sergeant&#8217;s pay, and obtained further data on <a href=\"https:\/\/www.ukpublicspending.co.uk\/spending_chart_1991_2021UKb_17c1li111tcn_30t_30_Defence_Spending_Chart#copypaste\">UK Defence spending<\/a> and <a href=\"https:\/\/www.statista.com\/statistics\/579773\/number-of-personnel-in-uk-armed-forces\/\">military manpower<\/a>, which I present in this chart.<\/p>\n\n\n<div class=\"wp-block-image\">\n<figure class=\"aligncenter\"><a href=\"https:\/\/davelevy.info\/wiki\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/10\/military-manpower-and-cost.png\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"650\" height=\"368\" src=\"https:\/\/davelevy.info\/wiki\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/10\/military-manpower-and-cost.png\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-5558\" srcset=\"https:\/\/davelevy.info\/wiki\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/10\/military-manpower-and-cost.png 650w, https:\/\/davelevy.info\/wiki\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/10\/military-manpower-and-cost-300x170.png 300w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 650px) 100vw, 650px\" \/><\/a><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\">Change in total budget vs change in army pay<\/figcaption><\/figure><\/div>\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\">Manpower<\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p>See <a href=\"https:\/\/commonslibrary.parliament.uk\/research-briefings\/cbp-7930\/\">https:\/\/commonslibrary.parliament.uk\/research-briefings\/cbp-7930\/<\/a>, a note on how they measure today<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Historical numbers, <a href=\"https:\/\/www.statista.com\/statistics\/579991\/number-of-uk-armed-forces-by-military-branch\/\">https:\/\/www.statista.com\/statistics\/579991\/number-of-uk-armed-forces-by-military-branch\/<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n<div class=\"wp-block-image\">\n<figure class=\"aligncenter\"><a href=\"https:\/\/davelevy.info\/wiki\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/10\/armed-services-personell-by-branch-stackedcluster.png\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"750\" height=\"564\" src=\"https:\/\/davelevy.info\/wiki\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/10\/armed-services-personell-by-branch-stackedcluster.png\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-6293\" srcset=\"https:\/\/davelevy.info\/wiki\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/10\/armed-services-personell-by-branch-stackedcluster.png 750w, https:\/\/davelevy.info\/wiki\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/10\/armed-services-personell-by-branch-stackedcluster-300x226.png 300w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 750px) 100vw, 750px\" \/><\/a><\/figure><\/div>\n\n<div class=\"wp-block-image\">\n<figure class=\"aligncenter\"><a href=\"https:\/\/davelevy.info\/wiki\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/10\/armed-services-personell-by-branch-openclose.png\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"1024\" height=\"597\" src=\"https:\/\/davelevy.info\/wiki\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/10\/armed-services-personell-by-branch-openclose-1024x597.png\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-6294\" srcset=\"https:\/\/davelevy.info\/wiki\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/10\/armed-services-personell-by-branch-openclose-1024x597.png 1024w, https:\/\/davelevy.info\/wiki\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/10\/armed-services-personell-by-branch-openclose-300x175.png 300w, https:\/\/davelevy.info\/wiki\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/10\/armed-services-personell-by-branch-openclose-768x448.png 768w, https:\/\/davelevy.info\/wiki\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/10\/armed-services-personell-by-branch-openclose.png 1101w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px\" \/><\/a><\/figure><\/div>\n\n\n<p>The Guardian <a href=\"https:\/\/www.theguardian.com\/news\/datablog\/2011\/sep\/01\/military-service-personnel-total\">on personnel number<\/a>s , dated 2011.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The recent white papers define their Army needs in terms of interventions, it would seem that army has two expectations, a war fighting combat brigade and joint task force, designed for rapid deployment and\/or medium term peace keeping.&nbsp; The <a href=\"https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/British_Army_of_the_Rhine\">BAOR<\/a> was two combat brigades in Germany, and declined from 53,000 in 1967, the year before the Soviet Union invaded Czechoslovakia and had declined to 25,000 in 1993, it;s final year, three years after the reunification of Germany.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\">Assets &amp; Capability<\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p>The Daring class destroyer, of too my mind, a cruiser replacement, has a speed of 29 knots, the Persian Gulf is about 93,000 sq. nautical miles and 98.5 nautical miles long &#8230; the F35 speed is 1,200 mph (1,042 knots).<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>I wrote <a href=\"https:\/\/davelevy.info\/on-trident-renewal\/\">a piece on Trident Renewal<\/a> in the blog published on May 2916, but written earlier as Labour took down the original posting. It identified failings in the then current defence estate, I am not sure the extent to which these have been filled, it seems that <a href=\"https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20210417190442\/https:\/\/www.royalnavy.mod.uk\/the-equipment\/ships\/destroyers\/daring-class\">the Type 45 Destroyer<\/a> now has an effective air defence system, the<a href=\"https:\/\/www.thinkdefence.co.uk\/uk-complex-weapons\/sea-viper-aster\/\"> Sea Viper took some time to come good<\/a>. We plan to increase the size of surface fleet, the tank regiment is now using tanks again. I am not sure if we have invested in sufficient airlift capacity. It seems we now plan to <a href=\"https:\/\/www.savetheroyalnavy.org\/a-closer-look-at-the-littoral-strike-ship-concept\/\">buy two littoral strike ships<\/a>, which have the advantage of being cheap, but if so, we&#8217;ll need to keep the marines and probably dedicate some AA &amp; ASW ships to protect them. The discussions about the LSS&#8217;s make clear that the Navy envisages two fleets, Atlantic &amp; Far East; I think this is a mistake and cannot be justified by a threat analysis, WTF are we doing back East of Suez but the Dutch Navy is also exercising with the Yanks.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>I am not sure <a href=\"https:\/\/www.savetheroyalnavy.org\/royal-navy-combatants-fitted-for-but-not-with-anti-ship-missiles\/\">if the surface-to-surface missile problem<\/a> has been solved? The fleet escort solution seems a mess, with<a href=\"https:\/\/www.savetheroyalnavy.org\/real-hope-for-a-bigger-royal-navy-the-type-32-frigate-concept\/\"> type 26, 31 and 32 all currently planned for use<\/a> today or in the short term. The primary anti-surface ship weapons today and for the foreseeable future are the so-called Hunter-Killer submarines, <a href=\"https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Royal_Navy_Submarine_Service\">of which the Royal Navy has seven<\/a> with three planned.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>On ground attack warplanes, do we need a new one? The <a href=\"https:\/\/www.flightglobal.com\/last-british-jaguar-shows-off-and-bows-out\/78037.article\">Jaguar lasted 32 years<\/a> and its replacement,&nbsp; the <a href=\"https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Panavia_Tornado#Royal_Air_Force\">first eurofighter Tornado<\/a> was retired in 2018 and we are now using Typhoons, first launched in 1994, so over 25 years old although the last one was delivered to the RAF in 2019. Here is an Australian&#8217;s <a href=\"http:\/\/www.ausairpower.net\/Analysis-Typhoon.html\">analysis, called &#8220;Demon or Lemon&#8221;<\/a>; he comes down in the middle but definitely not a Lemon in 2000, whether it&#8217;s so in 2020 is another question and it wasn&#8217;t designed as a ground attack plane.<\/p>\n\n\n<div class=\"wp-block-image\">\n<figure class=\"aligncenter\"><a href=\"https:\/\/davelevy.info\/wiki\/wp-content\/uploads\/2015\/08\/eurofighter.png\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"650\" height=\"187\" src=\"https:\/\/davelevy.info\/wiki\/wp-content\/uploads\/2015\/08\/eurofighter.png\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-2742\" srcset=\"https:\/\/davelevy.info\/wiki\/wp-content\/uploads\/2015\/08\/eurofighter.png 650w, https:\/\/davelevy.info\/wiki\/wp-content\/uploads\/2015\/08\/eurofighter-300x86.png 300w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 650px) 100vw, 650px\" \/><\/a><\/figure><\/div>\n\n\n<p><br><a name=\"leadership\"><\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\">Leadership &amp; Doctrine<\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p>As I sit down to write this, I suddenly realise it could be quite long; but this first draft won&#8217;t be. I went to the tank museum and one of the information placards spoke of how the Cavalry had tried to inhibit the introduction of the tank. Another suggested that the Army is always preparing for the last war. The placards on the birth of the Tank showed the British inspiration of <acronym title=\"\">iconoclastic thought<\/acronym> and the often conservative inhibitions of incumbent power. I was once told that &#8220;military intelligence&#8221; was an oxymoron. In James Meek&#8217;s <a href=\"https:\/\/www.lrb.co.uk\/the-paper\/v36\/n24\/james-meek\/worse-than-a-defeat\">review of the Afghanistan war<\/a> via book review, he identifies two factors related to leadership and doctrine as failures,<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p>the result was that the British military establishment put the preservation of its long-term budget ahead of the preservation of its soldiers in the field.<br>as the commanders who served in Afghanistan get their say, the dominant tone is of anger towards the Ministry of Defence and the army itself, which emerges as an organisation incapable of learning except by years of trial and error when real wars come along.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The army that went into Iraq and Afghanistan was hobbled by its lack of back office support. Defence Intelligence, the MoD\u2019s in-house intelligence agency, had got rid of its linguists. The MoD\u2019s main research centre was privatised in 2001<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<p>This led me to look for more evidence, I found, Games: Conflict, Competition, and Cooperation by David Blagden (Editor), Mark de Rond (Editor) , which is an anthology, [<a href=\"https:\/\/www.cambridge.org\/gb\/academic\/subjects\/general-science\/popular-science\/games-conflict-competition-and-cooperation?format=PB&amp;isbn=9781108447324\">abstract citation<\/a> | <a href=\"https:\/\/www.goodreads.com\/book\/show\/42847688-games\">googlereads<\/a> | <a href=\"https:\/\/books.google.co.uk\/books?id=yFl0DwAAQBAJ&amp;pg=PA94&amp;lpg=PA94&amp;dq=british+army+and+intellectual+inertia&amp;source=bl&amp;ots=wztqGHlOuL&amp;sig=ACfU3U1gkIkKjbrIXCjE4W8MqphqBZRYoA&amp;hl=en&amp;sa=X&amp;ved=2ahUKEwj1pYmv09PyAhVBZMAKHaPBA_kQ6AF6BAggEAM#v=onepage&amp;q=british%20army%20and%20intellectual%20inertia&amp;f=false\">google books<\/a>]. I bought it and read the Ledwidge article, and have posted <a href=\"https:\/\/davelevy.info\/wiki\/british-army-command-doctrine\/\">a stub<\/a> about it.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<a name=\"spring24\"><\/a>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\">Waiting for Starmer &amp; Healey<\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p>I posted <a href=\"https:\/\/davelevy.info\/slogans-arent-bullets\/\">a blog reviewing Starmer&#8217;s speech to Barrow dockyard workers<\/a>, these are my links,<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ol class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>It was reported on by <a href=\"https:\/\/www.ft.com\/content\/4dff4926-2dca-430a-884d-1c9ae65c231b\">the FT<\/a> &amp; <a href=\"https:\/\/www.nwemail.co.uk\/news\/24249990.labour-leader-sir-keir-starmer-makes-nuclear-pledge-visit-bae\/\">the NWE Mail<\/a>; I am of the view that they miss the point. <\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Paul Mason on his sub stack, <a href=\"https:\/\/htsf.substack.com\/p\/land-the-mods-burning-platform\">about a deficient Army<\/a>, and <a href=\"https:\/\/htsf.substack.com\/p\/you-only-need-tanks-if-you-want-to\">on overall deficiencies and how to pay for it<\/a>.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li><a href=\"https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Patrick_Sanders_(British_Army_officer)\">Sir Patrick Sanders<\/a>, (CoGS) made a <a href=\"https:\/\/www.whatdotheyknow.com\/request\/general_patrick_sanders_iavc_spe\/response\/2576534\/attach\/4\/20240301%20FOI%2002502%20Annex%20A%20CGS%20IAVC%2024%20speech%20FINAL%20CGS.pdf?cookie_passthrough=1\">controversial speech<\/a> in January 2024, in which he called for a higher expenditure and a stronger and scalable Army.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Mason caused me to look for his &#8220;funding gap&#8221;. There is a \u00a316bn funding gap between the requirements of the 2021 white paper and the budget. The requirements are probably deficient in that they plan to under-fund the Army. The public accounts committee undertook <a href=\"https:\/\/committees.parliament.uk\/work\/8121\/the-equipment-plan-20232033\/\">an Inquiry into the MOD equipment plan<\/a>; the plan itself is available <a href=\"https:\/\/assets.publishing.service.gov.uk\/media\/6380d715e90e0723443452ff\/The_defence_equipment_plan_2022_to_2032.pdf\">The defence equipment plan 2022 to_2032<\/a> as is the  NAO report, <a href=\"https:\/\/www.nao.org.uk\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/12\/The-Equipment-Plan-20232033.pdf\">NAO The Equipment Plan 2023 2033<\/a> and its <a href=\"https:\/\/www.nao.org.uk\/reports\/equipment-plan-2023-to-2033\/#downloads\">its landing page.<\/a><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Thinking about defence policy, there&#8217;s going to be another review. This started as a collection of articles leaked or inspired probably by senior army officers but in Nov. Johnson made a financial announcement seemingly in advance of the review announcement which led to me doing some reading and looking at previous strategic reviews, the armed&#8230;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":6427,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":"","_share_on_mastodon":"0"},"categories":[140],"tags":[1515,932,1514,141,1517,1516],"class_list":["post-5317","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-politics","tag-aircraft-carrier","tag-defence","tag-defence-review","tag-politics-2","tag-royal-marines","tag-tanks"],"share_on_mastodon":{"url":"https:\/\/mastodon.social\/@davelevy_eu\/112275409915739453","error":""},"jetpack_featured_media_url":"https:\/\/davelevy.info\/wiki\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/10\/qe-portsmoutnews-w1024.png","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/davelevy.info\/wiki\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5317","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/davelevy.info\/wiki\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/davelevy.info\/wiki\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/davelevy.info\/wiki\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/davelevy.info\/wiki\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=5317"}],"version-history":[{"count":8,"href":"https:\/\/davelevy.info\/wiki\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5317\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":11283,"href":"https:\/\/davelevy.info\/wiki\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5317\/revisions\/11283"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/davelevy.info\/wiki\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/6427"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/davelevy.info\/wiki\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=5317"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/davelevy.info\/wiki\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=5317"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/davelevy.info\/wiki\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=5317"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}