Do victims of a cyberbreach need to prove harm?

Do victims of a cyberbreach need to prove harm?

I have just posted to my linked in blog, on the reference from the Austrian courts as to whether victims of a data breach need to prove harm for compensation.

The Advocate General is not so sure, although on my CIPP(E) course the instructor was clear; a breach of rights is a harm.

I look at the GDPR, the DPA 2018, which confirms that in the UK, ‘“non-material damage” includes distress.’.

I conclude by noting that, “My experience in tracking the citizen’s panels of the Conference on the Future of Europe (CoFoE) is that Europe’s citizen’s, the children and grand children of facist and stalinist societies are looking for greater enforcement, not less.” Politicians in the EU are under pressure to go in the other direction.  …

More consequences of Labour’s cyberbreach

More consequences of Labour’s cyberbreach

The Labour Party can’t issue the ballots for their internal elections; they claim it’s a consequence of the cyber-breach last October.

The Party seems to have attempted to create a replacement membership database by updating its mail manager system and presumably adjusting the feeds although much of the functionality previously offered is no longer available and the feed from the financial system is now days or weeks out of date. We should note that the membership self administration tool is also now not available. The mail manager is obviously from observation slowly dying. It is known to be inaccurate; there are errors in terms of who it considers to be a member, their addresses, and their payment status.

The Party plans to replace this recovered system with an off the shelf package[1] from Microsoft. At the moment we are advised that it is unlikely that local party role holders will get access to this until next year.

Until then we have to use a known to be inaccurate database. From observing, presumably NEC authorised actions, it seems to be considered accurate enough to select councillor candidates and run trigger ballots. Procedure Secretaries have been told that they may not override the membership system even when variances are well known and provable. I question that this is legal in it breaches the duty to be accurate and not to automatically profile people.

What seems to be forgotten that is data protection rests on seven principles, Lawfulness, fairness and transparency · Purpose limitation · Data minimisation · Accuracy · Storage limitation · Integrity and confidentiality. Often too much or too little attention is paid to integrity and confidentiality and issues such as lawfulness, fairness, transparency and accuracy are forgotten.

They are running selections and triggers on data known to be inaccurate. This isn’t right.

This has taken 9 months to get here. While culpability for the breach may be questionable, not having a recovery plan and or not funding it is the fault of the Labour Party and thus its NEC. CEO’s have been fired for less.

Why was there no recovery plan? Did they do vendor due diligence on the member centre hosting provider, did they keep it up to date? Is there a risk register? Has the NEC or the risk committee approved the mitigations? In fact, what is the NEC doing about IT Risk? Is there a DPIA on reusing the mail system? Is there a DPIA on reusing the SAR Tool? Is there a DPIA on using the social media scanners they use? When will we get a data protection capability that protects members data from bad actors rather than from themselves?

Nine months failing to recover is shameful and unprofessional. NEC members should be asking why it has come to this and determine if they, through their inaction, are in fact culpable.


[1] This I consider to be wise, although they will need additional software modules to support Labour’s unique processes, such as donation monitoring. Although it seems they plan to customise the UI 🙁 …

What the CoFoE thinks about citizen privacy

What the CoFoE thinks about citizen privacy

The Conference on the Future of Europe, Democracy and Rule of Law panel has generated 39 recommendations to improve the EU’s Democracy and compliance with the Rule of Law. Three of these related to Privacy and one to Cybersecurity. I have drafted a response for CTOE, which I hope will become part of their response but did not form part of their first response, which is fortunate since I changed my mind slightly. The article, overleaf, covers regulations and sanctions, equality of arms, and enforcement and political will. ...

The 7 Principles

The  7 Principles

When evaluating Data Protection laws and enforcement appetite, one sometimes needs to refer to the 7 principles. These were agreed by the OECD in 1980 and I summarise them below.

  • Notice, Data subjects should be given notice when their data is being collected.
  • Purpose, Data should only be used for the purpose stated
  • Consent, Data should not be disclosed without the data subject’s consent
  • Security, Collected data should be kept secure from potential abuses
  • Disclosure, Data subjects should be informed as to who is collecting their data
  • Access, Data subjects should be allowed to access their data and make corrections to any inaccurate data.
  • Accountability, Data subjects should have a method available to them to hold data collectors accountable to the above principles.

Europe’s privacy laws are constructed by building legislative infrastructure based on treaties and then the creation of law. This diagram below shows the time line of European infrastructure (above the line) and law (below the line), it was made in a year or so ago and thus does not have the UK’s departure from the EU, nor the assignment of “Adequacy” by the Commission.

While much focus today is on the EU’s GDPR, the principles that underpin it, are more broadly accepted than that law, and in some areas, the GDPR maybe found wanting.

This blog post originally appeared on my LinkedIn blog. …

Lightening never strikes twice

Lightening never strikes twice

In my blogs on the Track & Trace failure [blog | linkedin], I make the throwaway comment that Govt. IT often fails repeatedly because no-one is accountable, nor punished and thus they fail to learn but in this case it’s not true; Dido Harding the CEO of the Track & Trace was CEO of Talk Talk when it was fined £ ½m for another data protection breach caused by another failure to in this case close down an application running on an out of date & unpatched version of MySQL, making it vulnerable to a SQL injection attack, one of the OWASP top 10 vulnerabilities.  How unlucky can you get? …